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2012 DEVELOPMENT POLICY LENDING
RETROSPECTIVE
RESULTS, RISKS, AND REFORMS
Cover photos courtesy of the World Bank Photo Library
2012 DEVELOPMENT POLICY LENDING
RETROSPECTIVE
RESULTS, RISKS, AND REFORMS
Operations Policy and Country Services
The World Bank
©2013 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank
1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-473-1000
Internet: www.worldbank.org
E-mail: feedback@worldbank.org
All rights reserved.
This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The
findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this volume do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Directors
of The World Bank or the governments they represent.
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The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying
2012 DEVELOPMENT POLICY LENDING RETROSPECTIVE RES
Cover photos courtesy of the World Bank Photo Lib
2012 DEVELOPMENT POLICY LENDING RETROSPECTIVE RES
©2013 The International Bank for Reconstruction a
iii ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
iv PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic Man
v CONTENTS Abbreviations and
vi Refo
vii Figure 15. IEG Evaluations of DPOs by Region
ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This repor
xi EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This rep
xii crisis. In terms of disbursements, DPOs reac
xiii on a less than complete universe of IEG eva
xiv discussion in PDs, and in particular in mone
xv and half years,14 there is potential for sign
xvi 2012 Development Policy Lending Retrospectiv
INTRODUCTION World Bank16 development policy l
2 Figure 1. The Spectrum of Bank Lending Instru
3 Box 1. 2009 Development Policy Lending Retro
5 CHARACTERISTICS OF DPOs Th
6 Figure 2. Regional Distribution of Commitment
7 Figure 4. Total Commitments FY95–12 $ Billio
8 Figure 6. Average Number of Prior Actions in
9 Figure 7. IBRD Commitments and Operations FY0
10 Figure 9. IBRD Thematic Distribution of Prior
11 Box 2. IDA Crisis Response Window As part o
12 Figure 11. IDA Thematic Distribution of Prior
13 Figure 12. Trends in Gender-Informed
14 Figure 13. DPO Commitments and Operations to
RESULTS This chapter reports on the results of
16 rating 81 percent of these operations as mode
17 Figure 16. IEG Evaluations by Type of DPO and
18 Figure 17. IEG Evaluations by Lending Instrum
19 Figure 19. Achievement of Targeted Results by
20 Box 3. The Long March from Inputs to Developm
21 supported the implementation of a manual of p
22 Falling Short of the Intended Results The ass
23 Box 4. Examples of DPOs that Fell Short of A
24 Box 5. Examples of DPOs in FCS that Achieved
25 Box 6. Examples of DPOs in FCS that Fell Sho
26 The quality of results frameworks varied by r
27 Thus development partners tended to cluster a
28 However, less than one-third of the DPOs incl
29 RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES Th
30 countries, the debt sustainability analysis w
31 national DPOs would also need to incorporate
32 A result of this governance selectivity of DP
33 Figure 29. Commitments by CPIA Rating 13 Ca
34 Figure 30. PFM Quality and the Average
35 Box 9. Taking Calculated Risks in Weak PFM E
36 to tackle weak economic governance could wane
37 Figure 31. Ratings of Fiduciary Risks FY09 Q4
38 direct and short-terms effects only, most pri
39 (up to Q3), suggesting that greater attention
40 there was a remarkable improvement in 2011 (a
41 addressed the environmental consequences of t
42 be a sign of a small population base or compe
43 Managing Development Effectiveness Risks87 A
44 and country-wide support of the reform progra
REFORMS This chapter assesses how the Bank has
46 pricing structure of DPOs with DDO.95 The DPO
47 Table 3. DPOs with DDO, April 2008–September
48 without drawdown and the second $2.0 billion
49 Table 4. Summary of Changes to Financial Feat
50 preparedness, and mitigation. The disaster ri
51 Table 6. DPOs to Political Subdivisions, Marc
52 While SDPOs would still have a shorter maturi
53 implementation of the government’s Emergency
54 The preparation of operations in the context
55 Box 17. High Transaction Costs in JBS Coordin
56 The minimal common agenda has been reinforced
57 Table 7. Pre-2010 Recipients of DPOs that did
59 CONCLUSIONS: FROM RETROSPECTI
60 Bank’s regional and corporate decisions on th
61 the relevance of each AAA to the specific pro
62 policy performance but limited access to capi
REFERENCES Action Aid International, 2006. Wha
64 OECD-DAC, 2012. Evaluation of the Implementat
65 ANNEXES
66 Annex A. Number of Operations and Commitments
67 Table 4. Trust Fund Commitments ($ millions)
68 Annex B. Methodology for Evaluating the Quali
69 Annex C. Methodology Protocol for Poverty and
70 Annex D. Methodology Protocol for Environment
71 Annex E. External Views on Development Policy
72 Annex F. Feedback from Consultations In prep
73 Summary of Stakeholder Comments (continued)
74 Annex G. Detailed Thematic Breakdown of Prior
75 Annex H. DPOs – Retrospective Universe Count
76 (continued) Country Proj ID
77 (continued) Country Proj ID
78 (continued) Country Proj ID
79 (continued) Country Proj ID
80 (continued) Country Proj ID
81 (continued) Country Proj ID